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abstract
The essay, which adopts a historical approach, presents and discusses 
the Brazilian trade policies implemented since the 19th century, as connected 
with industrial and development policies, not always in a coordinated man-
ner. Brazil was, and probably continues to be, one of  the most protectionist 
countries in the world, at the beginning for fiscal reasons (financing of  the 
State), then, in the 20th century, on behalf  of  deliberate industrializing and 
import substitution goals. The essay surveys the many policies followed in 
different phases of  Brazilian economic history, including the regional in-
tegration process of  Mercosur and the multilateral and hemispheric trade 
negotiations; it also discusses the recent re-commoditization of  its foreign 
trade and the retrocession to a series of  patently defensive policies, justified 
by a lack of  competitiveness of  its industries, by the way due to the excessive 
taxation and the bureaucratic entanglements set up by the very State that 
seeks to protect those industries from foreign competition. It concludes 
that a new economic opening or trade liberalization are not likely to occur in 
the immediate future. Albeit not original in scope or methodology, the essay 
integrates various sources and specialized literature, offering a synthesis of  
the state of  the art in this field of  study.
Keywords: Brazilian protectionism. Trade policies. Industrialization. Mer-
cosur. WTO.
resumo
O ensaio, que adota uma metodologia expositiva de caráter histórico, 
apresenta e discute as políticas comerciais brasileiras adotadas desde o sé-
culo XIX, tal como correlacionadas com as políticas industriais e de de-
senvolvimento econômico, embora implementadas de maneira nem sempre 
coordenada. O Brasil foi, e provavelmente continua sendo, um dos países 
mais protecionistas do mundo, anteriormente por razões fiscais (equilíbrio 
das contas públicas) e, a partir do século XX, tendo em vista objetivos de-
liberadamente industrializantes e de substituição de importações. O ensaio 
examina as várias políticas seguidas em diferentes fases da história econô-
mica brasileira, inclusive no processo de integração regional do Mercosul e 
no quadro das negociações comerciais multilaterais e hemisféricas; também 
discute a recente primarização do seu comércio exterior e o retrocesso re-* Artigo convidado
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gistrado em termos de políticas abertamente defensi-
vas, que são justificadas pela falta de competitividade 
das indústrias brasileiras, que é aliás devida à tributa-
ção excessiva e as dificuldades burocráticas criadas pelo 
mesmo Estado que busca proteger essas indústrias da 
competição externa. Conclui pela escassa viabilidade de 
uma abertura econômica ou de liberalização comercial 
no futuro imediato. Embora não original na temática ou 
na metodologia, o trabalho integra diferentes fontes do-
cumentais e a literatura especializada, oferecendo uma 
síntese dos estudos disponíveis nesse campo de estudo.
Palavras-chave: Protecionismo brasileiro. Políticas 
comerciais. Industrialização. Mercosul. OMC.
1. IntroDuctIon: basIc characterIstIcs 
Trade policy has two constant features in Brazil 
throughout the ages: one is the country’s modest and al-
most immutable share of  the global trade flows for the 
last half  century, and probably since the 19th century; 
the other is the equally constant belief  of  its political 
leadership in the virtues of  an industrial policy, which 
is reflected in an undeniable adherence of  its industrial 
elites to various kinds of  protectionist devices.
As regards the first characteristics, it is true that Brazil 
ratio of  global commerce has since long stabilized around 
a little over 1% of  the world’s total interchange of  goods 
and services; it could be argued that Brazil has, at least, kept 
pace with the progression of  trade flows, from the 1950s 
up to our days, as the share of  its foreign trade went along 
with the faster increase of  exchanged goods, over the more 
moderate growth of  the world’s GDP. As an excuse for the 
second feature, that is, for Brazil being a staunch protec-
tionist during most of  its economic history, the arguments 
mobilized by its political and economic elites in favor of  
those kind of  policies take support in ancient mercantilist 
doctrines that seek to promote national industry and its 
associated activities, which would be considered by them 
as unfeasible if  undertaken under liberal trade policies or 
in absence of  an active industrial policy.
The moments of  economic opening and trade libe-
ralization are indeed very rare in the economic history 
of  Brazil, in a long continuum of  various types of  de-
fensive policies and state activism that seem embed-
ded in a structural context of  political nationalism and 
economic introversion. As we shall see, Brazil moved 
away from a strong protectionist industrial policy only 
for a few times during its successful drive toward in-
dustrialization; those moments, by the way, were almost 
a side effect of  an economic policy seeking monetary 
stabilization or looking for a temporary correction of  
serious disequilibria in its external economic relations. 
Crises, internal and external, were the main factors that 
drove Brazil toward industrialization, at least in the first 
half  of  the 20th century. After the Second World War, 
this objective was pursued much more conscientiously, 
thus the much more diligent and deliberate choice of  
industrial and trade policies along defensive and protec-
tionist lines. National development was the consensual 
ideology of  Brazilians during most of  the 20th century, 
and industry was seen as the main tool for the accom-
plishment of  this almost sacred mission.
In recent times, Brazilian civil governments that 
succeeded the military regime (1964-85) adopted a less 
strict protectionist policy, but this was only to accom-
modate the requirements of  the integration process 
in Mercosur; under its scheme, national tariffs of  the 
member countries had to be replaced by a Common 
External Tariff, with a lower average than the preceding 
national lists (1994). But that was a temporary relief  on 
a structural defensive behavior that arose again a few 
years later: trade liberalization policies and tariff  reduc-
tion measures adopted in the first half  of  the 1990s, 
started to be reversed soon afterwards Mercosur beca-
me a “customs union” (this in paper, at least). 
During the 2000s, Brazilian government refrained 
from adopting an open protectionist policy only be-
cause there was a belief  in, and a commitment to, the 
conclusion of  the Doha Round of  multilateral trade ne-
gotiations; there was also a certain sense of  relief  deri-
ved from the 1999 deep devaluation of  the real, which 
assured, during most of  the following decade, conforta-
ble gains in the form of  trade balance surpluses (not to 
mention the peaks in commodity prices, which was the 
“Chinese factor”). As soon as the WTO negotiations 
foundered, at the end of  the 2000’s, and the external 
competitiveness of  Brazilian products were slashed by 
a raise in domestic costs, the defensive posture of  the 
political authorities and the protectionist instinct of  the 
industrialists emerged again, as vibrant as in the old ti-
mes of  import substitution.
This is the basic framework under which one must 
apprehend the true meaning and the essential nature of  
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Brazilian trade policies. The constant features, in histo-
rical perspective, are always there, and they are simply 
mercantilist and truly protectionist. At certain econo-
mic junctures it is possible to observe the erratic beha-
vior of  the official trade and industrial policies, which 
can be linked to the trends and flows of  the balance 
of  payments, as well to pressures exerted by internal 
lobbies (from both industrial and workers’ unions). In 
short, those are the constant features of  the Brazilian 
macro and sectorial economic policies. Let’s go now for 
the detailed history of  those policies.
2. hIstorIcal Development oF  
brazIlIan traDe polIcIes
The birth of  Brazil as a “customs territory”, in 
1808, precedes its actual existence as an independent 
State, which occurred only in 1822. In fact, Brazil 
did not attain effective customs independence befo-
re 1844, but it is interesting to trail the whole story, 
as it explains the protectionist instincts that Brazil’s 
proprietary and industrial classes would exhibit since 
then. The departure spot was the 1810 Trade and Na-
vigation Treaty, which Portugal had to accept under 
the pressure from the English cabinet, after the Royal 
Navy protected transatlantic retreat to Brasil of  the 
entire court and nobles to scape Portugal’s invasion by 
a Napoleonic army.2
Before that, Brazil did not have an independent ad-
ministration of  its foreign trade, for the whole system 
was working under the “colonial exclusivity”, in which 
the court exerted the monopoly over imports and ex-
ports (and prohibited even small industries in the co-
lony, as not to compete with Portuguese supply). All 
goods had to be carried by Portuguese ships, and pass 
through Lisbon, except some very few flows allowed 
under concession or bilateral treaties to be performed 
by other European merchants (slave traders, would be a 
more correct designation). 
To be true, the first act of  a commercial nature un-
dertaken by the Portuguese Prince, arriving in Brazil, in 
2 Cf. WILCKEN, Patrick, Empire adrift: the portuguese court in 
Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821. London: Bloomsbury, 2005; BETHELL, 
Leslie. The independence of  Brazil. In: BETHELL, L. (Ed.). Cam-
bridge history of  Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985. v. 3.
January 1808, was to declare Brazilian ports open to all 
“friendly nations”, which at that time comprised only 
England and Russia, in Europe, and a few other countries 
in the Americas. The bilateral trade agreement of  1810 
benefitted English merchants with a even lower tariff  
(15%) that was applied to the Portuguese goods (16%), 
besides being also a kind of  investment treaty, giving ex-
traterritoriality rights to His Majesty subjects, in the same 
manner of  the unequal treaties Great Britain was impo-
sing at that time upon other peripheral countries.
Coming after decades of  mercantilist policies ap-
plied up to 1808, and in a juncture when local merchants 
were preparing to invest their capital in an incipient ma-
nufacturing system, the bilateral treaty was seen by con-
temporaries as an exorbitant concession to England; it 
came to represent, to later historians, the first obstacle 
to the creation of  industries in Brazil. Even after having 
proclaimed the independence of  the country, the new 
rulers (half  Portuguese, half  Brazilians) had to stick 
to its provisions for another 20 years, as England was 
the sole source of  external financing for the new State. 
Only to put other countries on the same foothold as 
the Great Britain, the same concessions in tariffs were 
gradually extended to those commercial partners under 
new, albeit similar, bilateral treaties, that were negotiated 
between 1825 and 1834.3
The ruling class of  the First Empire badly suppor-
ted the humiliation, not exactly because the low tari-
ff  hindered any intention to industrialize the country, 
but for the small fiscal revenues it provided to the State 
treasury and the special privileges the treaty conceded to 
British subjects (who could not be prosecuted by Brazi-
lian judiciary authorities, being under a special clause of  
extraterritoriality). Those factors are probably the sour-
ce of  a constant defensive posture maintained by the 
Brazilian ruling classes throughout the ages in matters 
of  trade negotiations and economic concessions be-
nefiting foreigners, such as investments, acquisition of  
land, exercise of  certain professions or the exploitation 
of  natural resources.  
At least, after the denunciation of  all commercial 
treaties with foreign powers and the enactment of  a 
new tariff  in 1844, Brazil embarked in one of  most 
defensive trade policies ever seen in the world. Based 
3  Cf. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Formação da diplomacia econômica 
no Brasil: as relações econômicas internacionais no Império. 2. ed. 
São Paulo: Senac-SP, 2005.
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on the actual receipts of  imports reaped by the Brazi-
lian State since the middle of  the 19th century up to the 
1930’s crisis, Clemens and Williamson concluded that 
Brasil was the most protectionist country in the world 
(except for a brief  period of  late Civil War in the United 
States).4 In fact, the aggressive tariffs were not aiming to 
facilitate any industrial activity in Brazil – which could 
be a justification for very few cases – but to drain ever 
more resources to a voracious State (not so different 
from our days, by the way).
The fiscal pressure exerted over trade policy, effec-
tive until the 1930s, had to assume a variety of  forms, 
as the tariffs were not the sole expediency to which the 
State resorted as a means to replenish its coffers each 
time. Inflation, devaluation of  the currency, changes 
in the exchange standards and parities, pressures from 
commercial and industrial lobbies, all contributed to a 
messy combination of  trade and industrial measures 
that transformed Brazil in a highly bureaucratized State, 
where erratic or contradictory policies were adopted by 
successive governments, always under the menace of  a 
default in external payments. The Republic, in 1889, did 
not correct the confusion, but sustained it. against all 
odds: as the 1891 Constitution gave large autonomy to 
the states, they started to tax exports, which multiplied 
the bias against foreign trade already in force with im-
port tariffs, not to mention the prodigality of  external 
borrowing that federal states and even municipalities 
began to exert in direction of  external sources of  finan-
cing (most in the City, but also in Paris, and New York).5 
The Republic also adopted a set of  measures desti-
ned to promote industrial activity in Brazil, usually with 
the same bias against foreigners that characterized the 
old Portuguese mercantilist stance. A law on “national 
similarity” in fact barred any import of  a good that 
could be produced in Brazil, even at a higher cost and 
lower quality: formal description was enough to guaran-
4  Cf. CLEMENS, Michael; WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey. A tariff-growth 
paradox?: protection’s impact the world around, 1875-1997. NBER 
Working Paper, Local, n. 8459, 2001. Annex: Import duties over im-
ports, 35 countries, 1865-1950. Available at: <http://www.nber.
org/papers/w8459>. Access: May 2, 2013; CLEMENS, Michael; 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey; BLATTMAN, Christopher. Who protect-
ed and why?: tariffs the world around 1870-1938. Harvard Institute of  
Economic Research, Discussion Paper n. 2010, jun. 2003. Available at: 
<http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2003papers/ 2003list.
html>. Access: May 2, 2013.
5  Cf. TOPIK, Steven. Political economy of  the Brazilian State, 1889-
1930. Austin: University of  Texas Press, 1987.
tee a market reserve for the domestic “equivalent”.6 At 
the same time Brazil started to be a modest recipient of  
foreign direct investment, not always regarded with the 
same empathy as foreign financing: Brazilians usually 
love foreign capital, but mistrust foreign capitalists. 
Economic nationalism received a deep boost during 
the Vargas era, the 15 years after the Revolution of  1930 
that dismantled the old coffee Republic and started to 
build an industrial, albeit introverted, Brazil. New legis-
lation was enacted in each and every sector to give con-
trol of  all natural resources to the Union and in many 
urban activities – in public utilities, for instance – State 
authorization was required for its exploitation as a tem-
porary concession.7 Nationalization of  foreign compa-
nies was boosted with the Second World War; Brazil 
became a Bismarckian state, albeit with a very backward 
agriculture and a still fragmented industry. “Trade po-
licy” at that time consisted only in quantitative prohi-
bitions and the control of  imports; the GDP ratio of  
foreign trade was in a steady decline, and the receipts 
from exports of  a few number of  commodities (still 
concentrated on coffee) were the sole source of  foreign 
exchange.8 
After being a protectionist by necessity, for fiscal 
reasons, during most of  the 19th century, and also du-
ring the First Republic, Brazil became a protectionist by 
intent; the shortage of  foreign exchange did the rest. 
Anyway, defensive trade policies were maintained by 
habit, as the importance of  the external sector in the 
overall public planning, for macroeconomic or sectorial 
purposes, was greatly constrained. At the end of  the 
war, import receipts were as marginal as were direct in-
come taxation, that is, irrelevant for all policy purposes. 
At the same time, the sustained prices of  the commo-
dities and the trade surpluses cumulated during the war, 
as well as the repression exerted against imports for the 
whole period, allowed for one of  the few instances of  
trade liberalization: it was, nevertheless, of  short dura-
tion, as the foreign exchange reserves were quickly de-
pleted and, as soon as 1947, new import controls and a 
severe restriction on buying foreign exchange (dollars) 
6  Cf. VILLELA, Annibal Villanova; SUZIGAN, Wilson. Política do 
governo e crescimento da economia brasileira, 1889-1945. 2. ed. Rio de Ja-
neiro: IPEA-INPES, 1975.
7  Cf. VENÂNCIO FILHO, Alberto. A intervenção do estado no 
domínio econômico: o direito público econômico no Brasil. Rio de Ja-
neiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1968.
8 Cf. ABREU, Marcelo de Paiva. O Brasil e a economia mundial, 1930-
1945. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1999.
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were implemented; Brazil started to “manage” contra-
dictory exchange and trade regime for almost 20 years 
since then.9
3. reForm anD aDjustment to the multIlate-
ral traDe system
Brazil, one of  the “founding fathers” of  the Gatt-
1947, became an active participant of  the U.N. Trade 
and Employment Conference that, between November 
1947 and March 1948, approved the Havana Charter 
creating the International Trade Organization (ITO), 
dead at its birth.10 Despite the adoption of  many me-
chanisms and policies promoting the industrial sector, 
Brazil was still a commodity exporter, mainly coffee: for 
a brief  time after the war, its share of  the world trade 
represented a little more than 2% of  the total, but this 
was only due to the destructions in Europe and Asia. 
After the high peaks in commodity prices brought by 
war in Korea, that share has stabilized around 1%. But 
the 1950s and the 60s were also extraordinary years in 
terms of  industrialization and adoption of  trade and 
industrial policies that were to be the hallmark of  Brazi-
lian State planning for the next forty years. 
The rationale for the State activism in those areas 
were of  a macroeconomic nature or had a balance of  
payments justification: living under a scarcity of  dollars, 
inflows of  foreign exchange had to depend upon er-
ratic commodity exports; thus, for one side, the need 
of  a restrictive trade policy and, for the other, the very 
strong and visible hand of  the State to promote and 
sustain the nation’s industrial sector. A state company 
for oil, another for the energy, and a national bank for 
industrialization were created, together with a flexible 
exchange rate policy to accommodate the penury of  
dollars. In 1957, a new trade policy was enacted, with a 
complete revision of  all tariffs, this time with an explicit 
protectionist bias. 
The ad valorem basis of  the Empire and First Repu-
blic tariffs was replaced in 1934 by a specific tariff, only to 
be rendered irrelevant by the monetary disorganization 
9 Cf. BERGSMAN, Joel. Brazil: industrialization and trade policies. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
10 Cf. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Relações internacionais e política 
externa do Brasil: a diplomacia brasileira no contexto da globalização. 
Rio de Janeiro: LTC, 2012.
of  the world, the break-up of  exchange patterns, and the 
running inflation. So the 1957 tariff  reintroduced the ad 
valorem system, but at a much higher levels, thus requi-
ring a complete renegotiation of  the Brazilian schedule 
to the Gatt.11 At the same time, the “national similarity” 
law was reinforced to the point of  becoming inexpugna-
ble: all personal vehicles had to be acquired locally, as well 
as hundreds, many thousands of  other durable and non 
durable goods.12 Import bans became the norm.
Current historiography labeled this model as an “im-
port substitution process”, inserted in a developmenta-
list-nationalist context. In fact, most of  Latin-American 
literature about the period take its main concepts from 
studies and analysis made at the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and Caribbean of  the United Nations, 
the famous Eclac, under the guidance of  the Argenti-
nian Keynesian Raúl Prebisch. The main prescription 
was industrialization à la List, that is, with the required 
protection given to the “infant industry” (and remained 
as such for decades). Regional integration should serve 
this purpose, otherwise the continent, explained ano-
ther Prebisch thesis, would be hindered by the constant 
deterioration of  its terms of  exchange, due to the inevi-
table depreciation of  the value of  commodities, in face 
of  a constant rise in the price of  manufactured goods; 
inflation was a lesser evil, to be tolerated for the sake of  
growth and employment (income distribution was not 
yet in debate). Latin America detached itself  from the 
world trade and praised the virtues of  self-sufficiency.
In Brazil, public policies as well as the teaching of  
theoretical economics at the faculties followed the main 
tenets of  Prebisch’s heterodoxy, albeit with a certain 
tension with real world and the empirical economic 
data. Not surprisingly, state companies, and the public 
administration in general, performed badly, together 
with the strengthening of  populist and xenophobic bias 
of  many politicians; inflation derailed, due in part to 
the building of  Brasilia, by Kubitschek administration 
(1956-1960); economic growth and investments decli-
ned, and social unrest and military crises made the rest: 
soon, the middle class was protesting in the streets and 
querying the Army to restore the order. 
11 Cf. FARIAS, Rogerio de Souza. Industriais, economistas e diplomatas: 
o Brasil e as negociações comerciais multilaterais, 1946-1967. 2012. 
Dissertation (Ph.D.)—Institute of  International Relations, Univer-
sity of  Brasilia, Brasilia, 2012.
12  Cf. BAER, Werner. The brazilian economy: growth and develop-
ment. 6. ed. Lynne Rienner, 2007.
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The generals who took over the power in 1964 star-
ted a second phase of  the Bismarckian project that was 
launched during the Vargas era: they engaged econo-
mists and technocrats to reform every aspect of  the 
Brazilian economic and political life. Fiscal and mone-
tary reforms advanced the modernization of  the Bra-
zilian State, and huge infrastructure works were laun-
ched. The economic nationalism of  the military did not 
hinder strong flows of  foreign direct investments into 
industry and service sectors. Agriculture was also boos-
ted by research and technological improvements, as well 
as by post-graduate studies. The intention was to trans-
form Brazil into a “great power” in all areas: aerospace 
and nuclear industry (not excluding a “dissuasive” devi-
ce), energy, telecommunications, shipbuilding and the 
like. Except for oil and capital goods, Brazil achieved 
95% of  nationalization by late 1970s in the domestic 
current supply.
At that time, Brazil truly became a trade fortress, 
with plenty of  subsidization devices and protective 
mechanisms in order to transform the structure of  the 
foreign trade. At the end of  the military regime, ma-
nufactured goods had the greater share of  the exports. 
Brazil’s transgressions of  multilateral trade rules often 
generated complaints in Geneva; the usual excuse was 
balance of  payments equilibrium. Another argument in 
Gatt was that the national industrialization program of  
a developing country could not be evaluated by the same 
standards applied to the already industrialized countries. 
Brazil was one the most active promoters of  the 
Gatt reform, taking part in the drafting of  its Part IV 
– Trade and Development – and adding the clause of  
special and differential treatment for developing coun-
tries: it was materialized not only by the creation  of  the 
GSP (Generalized System of  Preferences, based on the 
principle of  non-reciprocity), but also through different 
rules allowing for greater discrimination against imports 
and foreign investments. Of  course, protectionism con-
tinued to be the norm and the accepted behavior of  all 
developing countries, specially those on a industrializa-
tion path like Brazil. Even after attaining a degree of  
concrete industrialization in certain areas even superior 
to the same sectors in the so called advanced countries, 
Brazil never accepted its graduation to an upper status 
in Gatt.
The end of  the military regime was abbreviated by 
the economic crisis induced by the external debt default 
and its consequences: high inflation, external insolven-
cy, low growth, disorganization of  public budgets at all 
levels of  the federation; moreover, regional banks were 
adding to the domestic debt, by creating “virtual cur-
rencies” to service the excess expenditures by state go-
vernors. At the Union level, Brazil had not only one, but 
three budgets, with a set of  different provisions in each: 
first, the normal fiscal accounting of  receipts and ex-
penditures (the only approved by the Parliament); there 
was also a monetary budget, operated at the discretion 
of  the financial authorities (that is, whenever the central 
government needed more resources, it printed money); 
the third, and sometimes highly relevant, worked just 
for the state companies (which were responsible, at that 
time, for 35% of  the GDP, and literally monopolized 
entire sectors of  the economy (the “commanding hei-
ghts”, or strategic areas, which were many, like steel, 
communications, transports, oil, shipbuilding, aeronau-
tics, etc.); this last one could be occasionally used for 
balance of  payments purposes (that is, going to external 
lending, attracting foreign investments, and so on).
At a certain point, specially after the external debt 
crisis of  1982 – which lasted throughout the 1990s – 
industrial and trade policies were at the service of  the 
balance of  payments equilibrium; no surprise, them, 
that distortions grew at every sector of  the economy, 
and protectionism became the norm, not the exception. 
Brazil was frequently asked to explain foreign trade res-
triction to its partners of  the Gatt: the standard answer 
was that exchange restrictions dictated the “temporary” 
administration of  the external trade, the quantitative 
restrictions, and the high tariffs (sometimes more than 
100%).
The return to a civilian administration, in 1985, did 
nothing to stabilize Brazil; on the contrary: “democra-
tic” pressures materialized in larger social expenditures 
and a new Constitution (in 1988) added to the disor-
ganization of  public accounts, commanding many new 
entitlements not properly funded by real resources, only 
by paper money. Few countries in the world experien-
ced the curious phenomenon of  “controlled hyperin-
flation”, that is, the continuous depreciation of  the cur-
rency – Brazil had six in less than 8 years – neutralized 
only by a total indexation of  the economy. 
At the height of  the crisis, monetary authorities intro-
duced more capital controls, adopted the centralization 
of  foreign exchange – the black market worked, some-
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times, at 60% of  the official rate – and declared a mo-
ratorium on the service of  external debt. Inflation went 
over the barrier of  two digits a month, and three digits 
a year; in less than six years Brazil had four new curren-
cies: cruzado (replacing the cruzeiro in 1986), cruzado 
novo two years after, cruzeiro again in 1991, and cruzeiro 
real, soon afterwards, only to be superseded by the real in 
1994 (with and indexed currency in between).13
4. regIonal IntegratIon process anD  
the mercosur path
By the end of  the 1980s, the overstretched industrial 
and trade policies were not responding to any rational 
objectives. The 1988 Constitution created new, costly 
rights for everyone: health, education, social security, 
federal transfers were granted, disregarding completely 
the question of  how or who would fund the new enti-
tlements. The modernizing administration of  Collor de 
Mello (1990-92) started a complete overhaul of  the old 
economic mechanisms and sectorial devices inherited 
from the military regime that were further distorted by 
the subsequent civilian government. Notwithstanding 
the freezing of  financial assets (that created many other 
distortions), the radical reform launched at the onset of  
“Collor plan” touched the various industrial mechanis-
ms – discriminatory and xenophobic, and heavily subsi-
dized, such as the market reserve for informatics – that 
were at the core of  the “industrial Stalinism” created by 
the military, and scratched completely the correspon-
ding trade policies: import bans were lifted, hundreds 
of  norms revoked, and a tariff  reform (scheduled in 
three years) started to bring the average 44% of  import 
duties to a more “normal” 14%. 
Bilateral economic integration with Argentina was 
being pursued since the democratization: first under 
sectorial protocols, then by means of  a common ma-
rket treaty (1988), due to be completed in 10 years, and 
finally, in 1990, with dispositions that changed the me-
thodology, establishing a full free trade zone and a cus-
13 For a detailed account of  hyperinflation in Brazil and the vari-
ous stabilization plans see: FRANCO, Gustavo. O plano real e outros 
ensaios. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1995; PRADO, Maria Clara 
R. M. do. A real história do Real: uma radiografia da moeda que mu-
dou o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2005; LEITÃO, Miriam. Saga: 
a luta do povo brasileiro em defesa da sua moeda. Rio de Janeiro: 
Record, 2011.
toms union in half  of  that time frame, promised for 
1995. With the incorporation of  Paraguay and Uruguay 
into the bilateral scheme in 1991, the Mercosur treaty 
was signed, which contributed to the consolidation of  
many changes being applied domestically. 
At the same time, the Uruguay Round come, finally, 
to completion, helping also to lock out some reforms 
and opening policy spaces for the enactment of  new 
legislation in many fields that were also at the heart of  
the old industrial and trade policies (intellectual proper-
ty, for instance, besides the completion of  the Common 
External Tariff  of  Mercosur, that replaced, in 1995, the 
Brazilian customs duties).14 Regional integration could 
help, in due course, the cause of  a more rational ma-
croeconomic and sectorial policies, including the erratic 
trade policy, if  only the founding treaty commitments 
were respected, which was never the case.
The new WTO agreements – Gatt-1994, as well 
as the various protocols that came together – and the 
building up of  Mercosur trade structure added to the 
ongoing process of  economic opening, trade liberaliza-
tion and, most important, the retreat of  the State from 
the commanding heights of  the economy (a task never 
completed, to be sure). Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
first as Finance minister (from 1993), after as president, 
in two mandates (1995 to 2002), lead the most relevant 
process of  economic reform since the Vargas era: FHC 
advanced the privatization of  State companies and the 
dismantling of  public monopolies that were initiated by 
Collor; he also undertook the difficult task of  amending 
the economic chapter of  the 1988 Constitution, a ugly 
assemblage of  naked irrationalities and pure xenopho-
bia that were discouraging the domestic entrepreneurs 
and worrying foreign investors. He barely conceived 
any new kind of  industrial policy – besides eliminating 
costly subsidies to inefficient producers in new and old 
industries – and made no advancements to the trade 
policies already in place during the transitional phase of  
the Mercosur (1991-1994). 
In fact, Mercosur started to derail from its original 
inception almost immediately after becoming an official 
“customs union”, in January 1995. Argentina first, Bra-
zil soon afterwards, both confronted to declining trade 
surpluses (in the case of  Argentina, deepening deficits) 
and growing external competition from third partners, 
14 Cf. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Mercosul: fundamentos e per-
spectivas. São Paulo: LTr, 1998.
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resorted to tariff  increases, albeit in a disguised manner: 
Argentina by the implementation of  a “statistical tax”, 
Brazil by limiting the offer of  trade credit by external 
financing, and both by arbitrarily including many pro-
ducts in national exception lists, thus departing from 
the Common External Tariff. Despite being a “cus-
toms union”, member countries were unable to set up 
a Customs Code, to be applied homogenously by their 
national customs administrations (or, preferably, by a 
single customs authority): Mercosur never ceased to 
be a permanent “customs union in construction”, each 
time pierced by new, non regulated national exemptions 
from the common rules. Worse encore: what was not 
supposed to arrive in a free trade area or in a customs 
union, started to happen, by means of  restrictions to 
intra-trade; barriers against the free flows of  goods 
under the pretext of  dumping or unfair competition 
(originating mainly in Argentina, against Brazilian pro-
ducts), that were unable to be solved by Mercosur’s dis-
pute settlements mechanism, had to be transposed to 
the arbitration system of  the Gatt-WTO.15 
Notwithstanding, Mercosur member countries star-
ted to negotiate conjointly the U.S. proposal for a new 
trade pact to cover the whole hemisphere: the Free 
Trade Area of  the Americas, launched at a summit in 
Miami, in December 1994, and due to be completed 
in ten years. Argentina, under Menem (1990-99), was 
much more favorable to the American project than Bra-
zil, a posture that was to be radically reversed after the 
dramatic economic crisis of  2001, and the new (2003) 
nationalist government of  Nestor Kirchner. Brazil too, 
never sympathetic to the idea of  opening its economy 
to the giant of  North America, dragged its feet in the 
negotiations, albeit seriously considering the possibility 
of  a certain degree of  trade and services liberalization, 
provided that U.S. offered real market access to its ex-
ports of  farm products and competitive industries (in 
a direct challenge to sectorial American protected and 
subsided branches). 
The cooperative posture of  FHC administration 
during the first phase of  FTAA negotiations was also 
radically reversed by the new Workers’ Party govern-
15 For a history and an evaluation of  Mercosur’s itinerary, see 
ALMEIDA, Paulo R. História do Mercosul: origens e desenvolvi-
mento. Espaço da Sophia, v. 5, n. 43, p. 63-79, jul./sep. 2011; ALMEI-
DA, Paulo R. História do Mercosul (2): crise e perspectivas no 
século XXI, Espaço da Sophia, v. 5, n. 44, p. 143-170, oct./dec. 2011. 
Available at: <http://www.espacodasophia.com.br/revista/>. 
ment leaded by Lula da Silva, who labeled the American 
proposal not an integration scheme but an “annexation 
project”; in fact, no technical studies were made to as-
sess the real impact of  a hypothetical FTAA in Brazil’s 
or Mercosur economies: Lula’s government simply 
abhorred the idea of  an economic integration between 
South and North America.16 
To summarize a very complex process, the fact is 
that both Kirchner’s Argentina and Lula’s Brazil, toge-
ther with Chávez’s Venezuela, cooperated actively to 
implode the American project, not on economic groun-
ds, but for pure political (and ideological) opposition. 
The clash intervened at the Americas summit in Mar 
del Plata, in November 2005, when those three coun-
tries started to taking a very different path than the one 
followed by the reforming Latin American administra-
tions during the 1990s; the previous years were outright 
condemned as neoliberal, as the “progressive” leaders 
started to proclaim the new virtues of  the old deve-
lopmentalism. In fact, a new kind of  economic policy 
began to bring them towards the past, carrying with it 
some old distortions of  the former nationalist and in-
troverted model of  development. 
5. real challenges anD lost opportunItIes: 
brazIlIan IllusIons anD DeceptIons
With some differences in speeches, but with the 
same acuity in the political criticism, both administra-
tions, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, and Lula in Brazil, 
merged efforts, from 2003 onwards, in the attacks to 
the alleged “neoliberalism” of  their predecessors. The 
arguments used for the dismantling of  previous econo-
mic policies were totally ideological in nature, but the 
practical consequences were relevant, and in some ca-
16 For a discussion on the main choices of  the Brazilian diplomacy 
during Lula’s two mandates, see ALMEIDA, Paulo R. Never before 
seen in Brazil: Lula’s grand diplomacy. Revista Brasileira de Política 
Internacional, v. 53, n. 2, p. 160-177, 2010. Available at: <http://
www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v53n2/09.pdf>.; ALMEIDA, Paulo R.: La 
diplomatie de Lula (2003-2010): une analyse des résultats. In: ROL-
LAND, Denis; LESSA, Antonio Carlos (Coord.). Relations internation-
ales du Brésil: les chemins de la puissance. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010. 
v. 1, p. 249-259. Available at: <http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.
com/2010/ 10/relations-internationales-du-bresil.html>. ALMEI-
DA, Paulo R. Lula’s foreign policy: regional and global strategies. In: 
BAER, Werner; LOVE, Joseph (Ed.). Brazil under Lula. New York: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009. p. 167-183. Available at: <http://www.
pralmeida.org/05DocsPRA/1811BrForPolicyPalgrave2009.pdf> .
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ses very regressive in their naïf  return to the old times 
of  economic nationalism and State control of  strategic 
activities. True, the reversion was much more dramatic 
in the case of  Argentina, than in the Brazilian itinerary 
followed by Lula and his economic advisers. The rea-
sons for this difference were not ideological, but the 
very contrasted situation of  the two countries, Brazil 
having stabilized soon after the turbulent times of  the 
financial crises of  the 1990s, and Argentina still in the 
turmoil of  the catastrophic ending of  the fixed curren-
cy regime established by the 1991 Cavallo plan. 
After the economic reforms – and some political 
chaos – introduced by the Collor presidency, Brazil rea-
ched, finally, a more normal economic behavior, under 
Cardoso as Finance minister (1993-94) and during his 
two presidential mandates (until 2002). The financial 
crisis iniciated by the frustrated currency devaluation in 
Mexico (December 1994) set the departure mark for a 
world financial storm that occurred some months later: 
first with the Asian exchange crises started by Thailand’s 
insolvency (June 1997), then the stock exchange plun-
ge in Hong Kong (October), followed by the political-
-economic crises in almost every other country of  Asia 
Pacific. Brazil managed to contain the capital flight, only 
by resorting to an extraordinary rise in interest rates. 
The grievous effects of  the Russian moratorium of  July 
1998, though, could only be defused by a stand-by ar-
rangement with the IMF and the financial help of  other 
creditor countries. Soon afterwards, political disagree-
ments between FHC and his former boss, vice-presi-
dent turned president Itamar Franco (1992-94), again 
governor of  Minas Gerais in 1995, provoked the dra-
matic devaluation of  the Real and an economic reversal 
of  the exchange policy, which started to work under a 
flotation system. 
But, new surprises expected at the corner: after the 
external balance was restored in early 2000 – allowing 
Brazil to repay some of  the financing received in 1998-
99 – it was time for Argentina enter into a free econo-
mic fall, followed by the social unrest and an overall 
presidential turnover at the end of  the year. Brazil had 
to enter into a new agreement with the IMF, in 2001 – 
for more than US$ 15 billion – only to renew the move 
the following year, with the doubling of  the financing, 
all this at the height of  the presidential campaign that, 
finally, brought Lula to the presidency. 
The main political effect of  all those financial crises 
and changes in economic policy in Brazil was to convin-
ce Lula that he could not possibly apply the economic 
receipts prescribed by the “economists” of  his own par-
ty. Having already been defeated in the previous three 
attempts to become president, he assumed the practical 
conclusion that he had to stick pragmatically to the same 
“neoliberal” policies implemented by his predecessor. 
Indeed, instead of  “changing it all”, as his campaign had 
announced optimistically, he changed nothing, and even 
preserved technocrats from the social-democrat gover-
nment of  the previous years. Better: the new economic 
authorities reinforced the economic mechanisms nego-
tiated with the IMF (for instance, the primary surplus 
in the budget, to pay for the public debt interests), and 
adopted an overall “neoliberal” approach to other ma-
croeconomic and sectorial policies. 
In short, “thanks” for the many disasters in Latin 
America, and his own unsuccessful electoral failures 
three times previously, Lula choose to be much more like 
Felipe Gonzalez – who presided over than a decade of  
economic growth and unemployment reduction in Spain 
– than Salvador Allende, the men who launched Chile 
into a political and economic disaster, due to his socialist 
receipts: nationalization, State command, inflation prone 
macroeconomic and sectorial policies, large benefits to 
workers and small peasants, economic pressure over ca-
pitalists or outright expropriation of  large land tenures, 
and open hostility towards foreign investments. 
Having learned a little from that, Lula disregarded 
his own party’s “economists” guidance, and choose the 
rational way of  applying practical economics. This was 
not an impediment to renew with some bad habits of  
the military regime (some of  them were no so secretly 
admired by the leftist economists): growing State ex-
penditures, the creation of  public companies, the belief  
in the visible hand of  the State guiding the markets, as 
well as some permanent beliefs of  the Left: indexation 
of  wages, generous dispensations for the workers and 
entitlements for the poor people, redistribution from 
above (that is, not by employment and the markets, but 
through the alleged social correctness of  the techno-
crats), and so on. 
To summing up, the results of  Lula’s moderate ex-
pansionary monetary and economic policies were: the 
rise of  public expenditures (above and beyond econo-
mic growth and inflation levels), more crowding-out 
in face of  an already low pattern of  domestic savings, 
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an expanded bureaucracy, more public servants, and 
more regulations (much more than needed for a emer-
ging market economy). Growth was pushed by exter-
nal demand, mainly by China hunger for commodities 
(of  which Brazil has plenty of), and by internal de-
mand, also stimulated by the expansion of  consump-
tion credit (with a financial market characterized by 
a share of  public banking equivalent to 40% of  the 
total credit). Social policies were truly redistributive, 
albeit much more based on the over taxation of  wage 
workers and entrepreneurs, than in expanded invest-
ments and reform; in fact, there was no elimination 
of  poverty, only consumption subsidies to the poor 
channeled by means of  Bolsa Familia, which is an im-
portant electoral device.
In terms of  trade policy, Lula’s government under-
took the task of  diversifying markets, not exactly as 
the outcome of  a careful study of  new opportunities 
in emerging countries, but as an decision taken on the 
basis of  a political choice: Lula himself  proclaimed the 
objective of  “reducing the commercial dependence [sic] 
from the United States”, and of  creating a “new world 
trade geography” (whatever it meant). In 2009, China 
became, as a consequence, the first trade partner of  Bra-
zil, but a new dependence was created, worse than that 
supposedly prevailing in the bilateral trade with the U.S.: 
against the much more diversified trade relationship 
with the “American empire”, the flows between China 
and Brazil were the perfect reproduction of  former co-
lonial ties from a century earlier, that is, commodities 
from Brazil (and just 5 or 6, that totaled 95% of  Brazi-
lian exports), and manufactures from China, plenty of  
them, electronics, textiles and apparel, shoes, parts and 
pieces, all kinds of  gadgets. 
In the end, Brazil reduced its historical external 
vulnerability – by accumulating huge foreign reserves 
– and expanded domestic levels of  employment. But 
the absence of  real economic reforms (specially in the 
taxation system), together with the erosion of  the quali-
ty of  economic policies (and even of  public institutions, 
like the Parliament, no to mention public education), 
joined in a perverse combination of  factors that led to 
the worsening of  external (even domestic) competiti-
veness of  Brazilian companies and to the precocious 
specter of  “deindustrialization”. Despite the favorable 
external climate for growth and development, and the 
adjustments made in the domestic policies by Cardoso’s 
administration, Lula’s years were a lost opportunity for 
reform and for the strengthening of  Brazilian economy 
to tackle the challenges of  globalization.
6. What Went Wrong? brazIl retroceDes  
Into protectIonIsm
It is true that, despite the formal adherence to a set 
of  typical Keynesian-like, Latin American developmen-
talist economic policies, Lula’s two governments did not 
operated a full return to the worst aspects of  the econo-
mic regime in place for many decades before Cardoso 
lead a conceptual revolution in the very heart of  the 
Brazilian state. After promising to change everything – 
and creating the very crisis for which he accused his 
predecessor, telling about his “damned legacy” – Lula 
behave at least cautiously: privatizations were not re-
versed (albeit they were curtailed short), the intellectual 
property law granting patenting for previously exclu-
ded sectors was not abolished, neither were the many 
constitutional amendments by means of  which most 
of  the discrimination against foreign companies were 
eliminated; in short, neoliberalism was pursued, under 
new clothes. 
But plenty of  old and new devices were introduced 
to accomplish or strengthen some of  the traditional ob-
sessions of  the “economic Left”: the reintroduction of  
some type of  market reserve for national companies; 
preeminence given, again, to the State companies, and 
the creation of  new ones; a set of  selective preferen-
ces in government procurement, based on an informal 
“national similarity law”, including allowing for a 25% 
overprice for buying national; bureaucratic requirements 
of  local content in high linkages productive branches; 
preservation of  legal barriers to foreign investments in 
many sectors; a tentative limitation of  land acquisition 
by foreigners; and an alternative foreign trade policy ba-
sed on ideological sympathies towards narrowly defined 
“strategic partners”, much more than in pragmatic con-
siderations.
It is true, too, that Lula’s administration did not sur-
rendered to the worst instincts of  that economic Left, 
such as the primitive protectionist devices of  the im-
port substitution era, the extensive currency and capital 
controls in practice for many decades before the 1990s, 
or an extensive manipulation of  exchange rates; it also 
generally respected the autonomy – which does not 
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meant independence – of  the monetary committee of  
the Central Bank in the management of  interest rates 
and other exchange mechanisms. But it did nothing, 
conversely, to make advances in economic opening, 
to further trade liberalization or start real negotiations 
to achieve significant commercial agreements, besides 
a few totally irrelevant Mercosur preferential arrange-
ments with a very limited number of  partners. It must 
be clearly stated that it refrained from explicit protec-
tionism normally preferred by the Left only because 
one of  its priorities in foreign policy was the conclusion 
of  the Doha Round of  multilateral trade negotiations, 
in the framework of  which it sought a Mercosur trade 
alliance with European Union; but there was no great 
enthusiasm to make greater concessions, including in 
new areas, as Lula government kept repeating the old 
mantra of  “policy spaces for development policies”, 
which always represented an almost empty slogan.
Incidentally, the attraction of  foreign direct invest-
ment, which was one of  his constant appeals, was con-
ceived much more as a means to create new domestic 
employment opportunities and to stimulate and increa-
se the internal market, than as a full scope strategy to 
insert more vigorously the Brazilian economy in the 
globalization process. Mercosur, originally, was explici-
tly conceived with this objective in mind, but since Lula 
has been transformed in a political forum, voiding its 
true economic content. 
Even the political offensive in South America, ano-
ther of  its priorities, was devised mainly to open new 
opportunities to big Brazilian companies in neighboring 
markets (with plenty of  official financing coming at redu-
ced rates from BNDES, the national development bank), 
instead of  creating a truly integrated economic space in 
the region. By any means, the retrocession to economic 
nationalism, the state dirigisme and associated populist 
practices, in implementation by many of  Lula’s “progres-
sive” fellow presidents, is anything but conducive to real 
economic integration. Special preferences given to some 
“strategic partners” in the regional scenario (with the 
“Bolivarian states”, for instance) and in other continents 
(Russia and China, mainly, but also with some least re-
commendable states, such as Iran) were devised and im-
plemented with grand political objectives in view, beyond 
and aside more concrete national economic interests.
Albeit not resorting to the worst examples of  “so-
cialist” travails on the way in, and in the manner of, 
Bolivarian countries, one country, Argentina, decided 
anyway to adopt a complete set of  economic features 
which implied, in practice, many steps backwards to-
wards the high times of  import substitution industria-
lization and of  protectionist policies of  the 1960s and 
70s. They were unleashed soon afterwards Nestor Kir-
chner started his presidency, in the middle of  2003, ha-
ving already benefitted of  the full political support from 
Lula in his campaign against the same Menem of  “neo-
liberal” times. The first move by both presidents was 
an attempt to replace the well-know Washington Con-
sensus – a practical guide for reform and adjustment 
in Latin American countries in ten big principles – by 
a so-called “Buenos Aires Consensus”: the document, 
negotiated almost secretively by radical Keynesians of  
both countries, before being approved by presidents in 
their first working summit, dispensed much more social 
receipts for a fair treatment of  the poor people than 
prescribed macroeconomic or sectorial policies in subs-
titution to the market recommendations of  the original 
John Williamson synthesis. If  they expected the new 
Consensus to be willingly adopted by other countries in 
South America, frustration was the sole response: only 
indifference gratified a bizarre search for an alternative 
to the hard realities of  the market economy. 
The conceptual framework under which the docu-
ment was conceived offered, nevertheless, a basis for an 
overall dirigiste approach to economic policy, which was 
applied in Kirchner’s Argentina in a more consistent way 
than in Lula’s Brazil. It’s a fact that, from Kirchner (Nes-
tor) to Kirchner (Cristina), Argentina went back many de-
cades, in terms of  macroeconomic and sectorial policies: 
starting with manipulating inflation indicators from 2007 
up to our days – which finally prompted an official alert 
from the IMF – their governments gradually increased the 
array of  interventionist measures in every sector of  natio-
nal economy: from abusive retenciones – that is, a levy on 
exports of  grains, meat and other primary commodities – 
to the renationalization of  foreign owned companies and 
economic pressure over non complying media vehicles, 
the two presidents exerted all types of  government intru-
sion on private activities of  companies and individuals. In 
a certain sense, Argentina was taken back to the 1960s’, 
as regards trade and investment policies, and perhaps to 
the 1930s’, as far as monetary and currency regimes are 
concerned; Brazil didn’t go, or is not (yet?) there.
Brazil started to adopt a vaguely similar economic 
model on the trade front only after Dilma Rousseff  
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became president, starting in 2011. But, in the mean-
time, Lula was highly tolerant towards the truly distor-
ting protectionist devices that Argentina erected against 
imports in general, and to counter Brazilian exports in 
particular. In fact, Argentina was contradicting not only 
the letter and the spirit of  Mercosur trade agreements 
– which commanded, in principle, a free trade zone 
among the four member countries, that should be in 
place since 1995 – but also opposing the very disposi-
tions of  the safeguards protocol of  the Gatt system; in 
a word, Argentina was acting not only arbitrarily within 
Mercosur, but as well in an illegal and discriminatory 
manner in the context of  the multilateral trade system 
administered by the WTO. 
Indifferent to the fact that those abusive restrictions 
were hurting Brazilian industrialists – specially those of  
domestic utilities of  the white line, and light industry in 
general – Lula adopted a passive posture when confron-
ted with Argentinean protectionism in practice: the only 
argument was that Brazil showed a consistent surplus 
balance in the bilateral balance, and could, thus, display 
some kind of  “generosity diplomacy”, giving Argentina 
a breathing space to reindustrialize the country after the 
2001-2002 crisis. Argentina, struggling to resume nor-
mal economic life after the moratorium and the radical 
change in its monetary and exchange regimes, started to 
impose restrictions on external trade, that is, imports, 
even from its Mercosur partners. 
First, Kirchner government tried to impose to Bra-
zil a strictly balanced bilateral trade, allowing for com-
pensations in case of  exchange devaluation, quantitati-
ve limitations and other correction mechanisms; then, 
Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish some correc-
tive mechanism of  the bilateral commercial and finan-
cial imbalances. Sometime between 2004 and 2005, 
and after some squabble over the modalities of  those 
compensating devices, the two countries implemented 
– not in the framework of  Mercosur, which would be 
the more appropriate, but only bilaterally – a system to 
be designed as MAC, Mechanism of  Competitive Ad-
justment, with the objective of  legalizing the unilateral 
restrictions imposed by Argentina.17 
17  It is relevant to clarify that, at the initial stages of  the evaluation 
of  Argentina’s proposal by the Brazilian government, the technical 
staff  in Itamaraty – that is, its diplomatic corps engaged in inte-
gration affairs – was opposed to the mechanism of  compensation 
suggested by Argentina, considering that its introduction was incon-
sistent with Mercosur rules, but the decision had already been taken, 
In the end, even allowing for the resumption of  
bilateral trade and the normal increase in commercial 
and investment flows between the two countries after 
Argentina renewing with economic growth, a negative 
result of  those restrictions was the relative decrease of  
the share of  Mercosur in the total external exchanges 
of  Brazil: from a high rate of  almost 16% of  its global 
foreign trade before the 1999 exchange crisis, intra-re-
gional flows remained below 10% in the geographical 
Brazilian trade distribution, even with a progressive rise 
in volume and value (but always below the overall trade 
growth). Worse, with the growing inflation and exchan-
ge distortions cumulating in Argentina, its government 
started to multiply trade restrictions, which resulted in 
actual absolute decrease of  Brazil’s exports to Argenti-
na, the third major in importance (after China and the 
U.S., not counting the European Union as a bloc). 
But those were concrete manifestations of  the 
abusive trade restrictions taken unilaterally by Argen-
tina, which could be considered, from a neutral stand-
point, as unintended consequences of  its adjustments 
to a post-crisis scenario. However, Brazil itself  choose 
to implement its own trade restrictions, also renewing 
with old practices of  the 1960s’ and 70s’. They were 
conceived, at first, to help the local automotive industry 
sustain the competition from cheaper vehicles impor-
ted from Asia, which were hurting the old local plants, 
mainly composed of  American and European marks; 
it is true, also, that most of  those industries are located 
near São Paulo, whose industrial suburbs are the core 
of  metallurgical trade unions and of  the workers cen-
tral unions that were to be a basis for the creation of  
Lula’s Workers’ Party in 1980. The government impo-
sed, starting in 2011, an extra-tax on imported vehicles 
not complying with a obviously abusive requirement of  
60% local content, a decision which is clearly inconsis-
tent with the WTO agreement on Trims (Trade related 
aspects of  investment measures); again, it defined, af-
terwards, a policy to stimulate investments in the same 
area, which included many restrictive requirements re-
gulated by Trims and other WTO agreements.
At the general level of  trade policy, many new bar-
riers were erected against imports of  industrial compe-
ting manufactures according to a very used scenario: 
after complaints by entrepreneurs from exposed bran-
ches, the government invariably invoked some reason 
politically, in the Presidency, to accept this bizarre scheme.
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of  high social impact – that is, unemployment – to 
adopt defensive measures, generally expressed in terms 
of  tariff  rises (but also antidumping). In the absence 
of  fixes at Mercosur level – for instance, higher duties 
in the Common External Tariff  – the products are in-
cluded in a national exception list (which should be, in 
principle, temporary). In practice, taking into account 
the extension and variety of  protectionist devices, it 
could be said that Brazilian government abandoned any 
perspective of  finishing the Doha Round of  multilateral 
trade negotiations.18
7. What lIes aheaD: a Fortress brazIl  
or an openIng to globalIzatIon?
In September 2013, a Brazilian diplomat, Roberto 
Azevedo, started as the new Director General of  the 
WTO, after a tiresome campaign that led him to pay 
visits in every continent and to a vast number of  mem-
ber countries. This is simple a fact, being also facts that 
he received his many votes from the large majority of  
developing member countries and that he received less 
support, or scant votes, from the biggest trade partners, 
whose relative number is probably the inverse of  their 
share of  the world trade. But it is also a fact that deve-
loping countries, and some of  the biggest trade players 
among them – such as China, the greatest importer and 
exporter in the world, together with Brazil, Russia, In-
dia, Indonesia, and many others – have today a larger 
participation in the world flows of  goods than it was 
the case when WTO emerged, at the end of  Uruguay 
Round.
The big question arising from those simple facts is 
to discern what his success in being chosen to lead an 
important organization as the WTO means for Brazil, 
as well as for the future of  the multilateral trade? Ha-
ving been the Brazilian representative in Geneva for the 
five previous years, and, before that, as the official res-
ponsible for trade negotiations in the Brazilian ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Azevedo was one of  
the most knowledgeable person about the Doha Round 
and the foreign trade policy of  Brazil, having as such 
established his credentials as a fine negotiator and as 
a trustful person from the stand point of  almost every 
18 Cf. RICUPERO, Rubens. A maior mudança da política externa. 
Política externa, v. 21, n. 3, p. 95-100, jan./mar. 2013. 
one of  the WTO members, including the advanced 
countries, that denied him their final votes. 
No one, however, would deny his personal capacity 
and technical competence as a front line operator for 
Brazil during the agonizing phase of  the Doha Round, 
from 2009 to our days. This is a fact, being also a fact 
that he was not among the policy makers behind the 
instructions he was receiving from Brasilia; those di-
rectives were taken at a higher decision level than was 
the case even when he was in charge of  the multilateral 
economic affairs in the Itamaraty. There is another fact 
that one have to recognize that Itamaraty was no more 
the fulcrum of  the decision making process in terms of  
trade policy, having being sideline from the center by 
people working at the two most important economic 
ministries: Finance and Foreign Trade.
It is clear, from what already has been said in the 
preceding sections, that Brazil became a, or returned 
to, a basic commodity exporter, which it was until the 
1960s: much like its traditional concentration in a few 
primary commodities for centuries, until the industriali-
zation drive of  the middle 20th century, its trade balance 
became heavily dependent of  five or six main agricul-
tural products and iron ore. It is also clear that, policies 
and measures which could be supposed to have being 
abandoned since the 1990s, are back again, with a re-
newed impulse. Those are not the multilateral trading 
policies designed at Itamaraty, but a new set of  guide-
lines arising from an little bunch of  developmentalist 
Keynesians of  the old style at the two other ministries. 
Not that Itamaraty could be considered as a beacon 
of  classical liberal thinking among the mercantilists; to 
the contrary: diplomats also share a distinct apprecia-
tion for developmentalist policies of  the classical Ce-
palian kind, that is, Prebischian Keynesianism, albeit 
moderate and of  a more sophisticated species. But they 
had to admit that ideological preferences of  the new 
rulers were being tilted not towards Adam Smith, but 
in the direction of  Friedrich List and Mihail Manoi-
lescu.19 In short, with the crisis of  2008-2009, and the 
19 Both well-known ideologues of  the managed trade and of  pro-
tectionism were always praised and much appreciated among and by 
economists, industrialists and decision makers in Brazil, since long; 
see ALMEIDA, Paulo R. Brazilian economic historiography: an es-
say on bibliographical synthesis. In: ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE ECONOMIC & BUSINESS HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
38., May 23-25, 2003,  Baltimore, Maryland. Historiografia econômi-
ca brasileira. Revista de Economia e Relações Internacionais, v. 11, n. 21, 
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dim prospects of  a successful conclusion of  the Doha 
Round, together with the vanishing trade surpluses in 
Brazil’s balance of  payments, protectionism became the 
norm, not the exception. Irony of  the ironies: the new 
(or renewed) condition of  commodity specialization 
was construed at the same time that Lula’s government 
declared very clearly its preference for a “strategic par-
tnership” with China, which was supposed to establish 
a reciprocally beneficial relationship with Brazil (having 
become its first trading partner in 2009), including the 
full support of  the Asian giant for the eternal Brazilian 
quest for a permanent chair in the UN Security Council. 
For the sake of  its political coherence, Lula and Dilma 
administration never blamed China for any kind of  dis-
loyal trade, State subsidies or currency war, preferring 
to accuse both U.S. and EU of  protectionism and “fi-
nancial tsunami”. 
Having those facts into account, what could be futu-
re behavior of  the new Director General of  WTO?20 To 
begin with, he will have to put in the agenda and tackle 
already made complaints by the most important trading 
partners of  Brazil – U.S., EU and Japan, with the ex-
ception, for the moment, of  China – against measures 
of  trade and industrial policy which are unquestionably 
biased towards local companies, or national providers, 
discriminating against foreign suppliers, either by tariff  
devices or fiscal facilities conceded in connection with 
local content. Many of  the defensive measures adopted 
in the last two years seems to violate the investment 
agreement (Trims) accepted by Brazil in the outcome of  
Uruguay Round and the creation of  the WTO. Secon-
dly, he has to balance his independence and neutrality 
as the General Director against the fact that he is also a 
relatively junior Ambassador who will probably return 
to his diplomatic career, after one or two mandates in 
the WTO management. 
It is also almost an established fact that Brazil will 
continue to assist, in the foreseeable future, a progressi-
ve deterioration of  its external position, which is surely 
to be reflected in growing transaction accounts deficits. 
Brazilian economy endures a standstill and persists in 
a quasi-stationary state, characterized by low growth 
rates and high inflation (in the average, the double of  
p. 5-21, jul. 2012.
20 In an interview he gave shortly after being elected, Ambassador 
Azevedo stated very clearly his free trade credentials; Cf. AZEVE-
DO, Roberto. O novo guardião do livre mercado. Veja, n. 2322, May 
22, 2013.
other emerging countries); furthermore, its exporters 
lose competitiveness, abroad as well as in the internal 
market, and most of  its entrepreneurs suffer from one 
of  the most difficult business environment in the world, 
made of  high taxation, bureaucratic entanglements, ex-
cessive State regulation, poor infrastructure, and many 
other negative features of  its cartelized and over pro-
tected markets. If  it was not for its high competitive 
agribusiness, and the relatively huge foreign currency 
reserves, the looming current transaction deficit might 
be already taken the format of  a crisis. 
In the absence of  a courageous and serious attempt 
at structural reforms – which in any case would require 
some time to be effective – to improve productivity le-
vels and give a new impetus to its weakening industrial 
basis, the most probable outcome of  the current situa-
tion is a strengthening of  the protectionist instincts of  
Dilma Rousseff ’s government and the continuation of  
its piece-meal approach to sectorial reforms, made of  
limited, partial and temporary tax reductions, together 
with credit largesse by the BNDES and extended finan-
cing by the official banks (which today are responsible 
for almost half  of  all financial borrowing in Brazil). The 
worsening fiscal situation will probably not facilitate the 
adoption of  any huge horizontal program of  innova-
tion enhancement for the industry, and the initiatives at 
vertical stimulus to a selected chosen few of  prospecti-
ve “champions” at world level have already proved un-
successful. The industrialists have also already perceived 
that limited tax reduction, modest currency devaluation 
and some official credits will not solve Brazilian structu-
ral problems; they will continue, then, to suggest “tem-
porary” protection, more introversion towards internal 
market, and the negotiation of  significant trade pacts 
to guarantee market access at targeted economies. But 
even that is showing uncertain or moderate alleviation 
from the current economic ills.  
It seems improbable, then, that Brazil should take 
a decisive road towards globalization and a new eco-
nomic opening, least of  a radical departure from the 
economic ideology of  its current leaders (or a fall in the 
tribulations of  a new economic crisis). It is also unlikely 
the erection of  a national commercial fortress, as Brazil 
has to abide to some existing rules of  Mercosur and it 
can strengthen the economic ties in the South American 
context. But it is also true that Argentina and Venezuela 
are on the verge of  serious domestic and external cri-
ses, and that the Pacific coast neighbors – namely Chile, 
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Peru, Colombia, not to mention Mexico, further North 
– are aggressively seeking expanded linkages, of  com-
mercial and investment types, with the whole Pacific ba-
sin. Even in its South American “chasse gardée”, China 
is making inroads of  a multiple nature, which reduces 
a little more the maneuvering space of  the Brazilian 
businessmen in the region. Incidentally, even initiatives 
that Brazil promoted in the recent past, in the wake of  
political enthusiasm with its “South-South diplomacy”, 
such as trade pacts among developing countries, have 
not yet received the signing of  the presidency and the 
subsequent approval of  the Congress; well, legislators 
will probably ax many tariff  concessions in a growing 
range of  endangered Brazilian industries.
Decidedly, times are not favorably for a bright Brazi-
lian future in the new global economy, as it spent most 
of  the last ten years surfing in the Chinese commodity 
bonanza, without taking the effort to reform and mo-
dernize its economic industrial basis or to run after tra-
de pacts that could guarantee some market access and 
specialized niches in relevant countries. A probable evo-
lution could be designed in the form of  a continued 
erosion of  its competitive position around the world, 
accompanied by an introspective posture that should 
reinforce the same traits that are being consolidated as 
defensive policies nowadays. Trade and industrial poli-
cies have always been devised and implemented as com-
plementary tools in favor of  the national sacred mission 
of  industrialization. As the current national drama as-
sumes the ugly feature of  de-industrialization, Brazilian 
leaders will have to scrap old economic ideologies and 
start to thinking about structural reforms again. History 
is not kind with hesitant and dubitative leaders; deca-
dence is not a better alternative. 
[Hartford, May 14, 2013; revised: May 20]
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